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The variation in Russia’s foreign policy in Near Abroad
ABSTRACT

The variation in Russia’s foreign policy in Near Abroad after the disintegration of the
USSR
by
Nataliia Donchenko
Advisor: Julie George

This master thesis sets out to explain the complex nature and variation in Russian foreign policy
in Near Abroad states from the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 and the accession of
Boris Yeltsin to the end of Vladimir Putin’s third term as President of the Russian Federation. I
analyze Russian foreign policy through the lenses of cultural, external, domestic and institutional
determinants. Due to the limit of the paper, I look at three “frozen” conflicts that Russia got
involved into since the dissolution of the USSR – Transnistria (Moldova) in 1992, Abkhazia
(Georgia) in 2008, Crimea (Ukraine) in 2014 (although there are more “frozen” conflicts:
Nagornyi Karabakh in Azerbaijan, for example). The goal is to assess what affects the
dichotomies of continuity and change, consensus and conflict, and variation in making foreign
policy decisions in regards neighboring states, specifically Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. My
argument is that the change in understanding the role of Russia in the world among Russian
political elite and the formation of a new strong national identity during Putin administration led
to a variation in Russian foreign policy in solving different conflicts in the same region of near
abroad countries from being passive and indecisive in 1992 when an understanding of Russia’s
national identity was conflicted, to being an assertive and insistent as the idea of Russia’s role in
the world has strengthened among Russian political elite.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Theories of international relations and Russian foreign policy
The purpose of this study is to find the answers to some questions regarding Russian
foreign policy in Near Abroad states after the dissolution of the USSR. What explains the
variation in the Russian Federations’ foreign policy toward the former Soviet successor states
since the Soviet Union collapsed? What factors best explain its approach toward conflict-ridden
areas like Moldova and Georgia? To comprehend an enormous amount of information regarding
Russian foreign policy behavior and to find answers to the research question, it is important to
analyze the Russian foreign policy approach through the lenses of the theories of international
relations.
Since 1991 to 2016, Russia’s foreign policy towards its immediate neighbors has been a
complicated one, with overlapping approaches that have varied from supportive to
interventionary, from peaceful to violent. The Near Abroad refers to the fourteen countries that
are not Russia but were once part of the Soviet Union, such as Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine,
that I use in this study as case studies to illustrate how Russian foreign policy has changed over
the last twenty-five years in the region. When we examine the changes in Russian foreign policy
from 1991-2016 through the theoretical lenses of realism, institutional liberalism, and
constructivism, we find that the realist and liberal approaches undervalue norms such as state
identity and memory, which assert powerful influence over domestic, foreign policy preferences.
One of the main theories of international relations that help us to frame states affairs is
realism. As “classical” realists Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr argued, the primary
objects of study are states, which they understood to be unitary actors, whose main goal was a
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survival and maximizing power in an anarchic system of states. The goals pursued by these
political actors are usually in conflict with goals of other political actors in the system since there
are both expansionary and status quo states. Also, these goals are material, and the resolution of
conflicts between actors is related to their material capabilities (Walt, 1998). Classical realists
such as Hobbes, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau assigned egoism and power politics primarily to
human nature, while neorealists focus on anarchy (Wendt, 1992). The neo-realism, or structural
realism, discussed explicitly by Kenneth N. Waltz in “Theory of International Politics,” is seen
as a major push forward of the classical realist theory as described by Hans Morgenthau and
others (Schroeder, 1994). Waltz made two main assertions in regards international politics. The
first assertion is that all states operate under structural constrains of anarchy, self-help, and
balance of power. The second assertion is that all states are “like-units,” their primary function is
to survive in a self-help world. What makes states different is their power position in relationship
to each other. Thus, an international system that functions under conditions of anarchy forces
states to concentrate its resources on security, and only after a certain level of security is reached,
states can pursue other goals. States that do not follow rules of the system get punished by the
system in the form of threat of attack and other serious consequences (Waltz, 1979). However,
even in the anarchic world of international politics where the level of trust is low, and the level
of uncertainty is high, cooperation is possible. As neo-realist would argue, this happens for the
sake of security. Most of the time in the realist realm cooperation takes a form of either
bandwagoning or balancing against an actual or potential hegemon. Bandwagoning is a strategy
of joining the stronger side for the sake of protection and payoffs, even if it comes with some
sacrifice of independency. On the other side, balancing is a strategy of joining alliances to
protect themselves from a state or number of states which pose a threat (Walt, 1985). Neo-realist
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scholars argue what type cooperation between states happen more often, for example, Walt state
that balancing between strong states happens more often and that even if weak states bandwagon
sometimes, it does not affect the system of IR significantly (1985). On the other hand, Schroeder
disagrees with Walt’s statement and argues that bandwagoning happens more often than
balancing, providing examples of Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), the Crimean War (1853-56),
the First World War (1914-18), and the Second World War (1939-1945). Nevertheless, it is hard
to distinguish the real motives of a state in joining the alliance: even if a state is bandwagoning
for a profit, it would still make a claim that it is balancing (Schroeder, 1994).
As Russian-US relations faced challenges over issues such as NATO expansion and the
NATO bombing in Kosovo, Russia reasserted itself at the expense of other former republics of
the USSR. Realists believe that the national security comes first, and there are two potential
kinds of threats: external and internal. In rationalist framework, Russia could suffer from
external threats such as attempts to challenge the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,
blocking the integration in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and political
instability in neighboring countries. Potential internal threats are inter-ethnic and regional
conflicts, organized crime, economic decline, degradation of the environment, lack of
information security. When Putin came to power at the end of 1999, his foreign policy approach
combined the vision of realpolitik with an understanding of interdependence and international
economic integration. Also, the issue of world order came back into the discussion as the US
invaded Iraq.
While realism was one framework to understand Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, it
certainly wasn’t the only one, because one also sees the growth of the use of liberal institutions at
the same time, especially with economic organizations. According to MacFarlane (1999), the
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Russian government did not support the balance of power in international relations, and the
realism was not the dominant approach in the way Russian political elite saw the future of the
world, including Russia. While neorealism explains some aspects of international cooperation
and states behavior in general, neo-liberal school of IR claims that realism is too static and does
not account for a change and development in the international system (Schroeder, 1994). With its
focus on the absolute gain as opposed to relative gains in realism, neoliberalism views interstate
cooperation possible. Neoliberal scholars do not condemn the neorealist notion that states would
pursue their national interests; neoliberalism emphasizes that cooperation is in the interest of
states. Neoliberalist asks questions such as “How much a state is gaining from a cooperation
compared to a state that is not cooperating?”, while neorealist asks questions such as “How much
a state is gaining from cooperation compared to other states that are cooperating?”. Analyzing a
question of variation Russia’s foreign policy in Near Abroad through the lenses of neoliberalism
brings a deeper understanding of a possible interstate cooperation because the theory of
neoliberal institutions emphasizes the importance of international government organizations
(IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in promoting states’ collaboration on global
issues that are truly a collective action dilemma. Actors create institutions to solve issues they
encounter, and the institution’s character reflects those issues and how they are being faced.
International institutions in the liberal theory enhance the cooperation between states by reducing
transaction costs for creating and drafting agreements, uncertainty about states’ intentions, and
monitoring for states’ compliance (Morrow, 2001). Binding agreements reached with an active
involvement of IOs call for “general principles of obligation or diffuse reciprocity” (Mitchell &
Hansel, 2007). Also, international organizations provide a forum for repeated interactions
between states, which might make enforcement of international norms and rules easier. Repeated
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interactions between actors in IR create a notion of the “shadows of the future” that makes
enforcement of agreements easier, but striking the bargain harder because states are very careful
about what agreement they claim a commitment to, since non-compliance would be costly in
terms of a state reputation in the institution (Mitchell & Hanson, 2007).
However, liberalism might be perceived differently in different economic and social
context. As Tsygankov and Tsygankov argue, Russian liberalism, although heavily influenced by
American academia, is different from Western liberalism, and it asks questions such as 1)
Which world order is emerging after the Cold War and which is the most preferable for Russia?
2) How are the state, its sovereignty, and national interests are affected in the era of
globalization? 3) Which strategy should Russia adopt to adequately respond to the world’s new
conditions and challenges? The debate between realists and liberalist was the most evident on
issues of the CIS integration and European security (Tsygankov, 2010). Liberals argued that the
main challenge for Russia was not integration or disintegration of the CIS, but rather a successful
completion of democratic and economic reforms in the region. In regards to the European
security, liberals argued that Russia should act towards strengthening multilateral institutions
which would act as a guarantor towards the return of the balance of power politics. Realists
disagreed with liberals about the nature of the post-Cold War world order and viewed NATO
having offensive, rather than defensive intentions. As a result of the liberalist influence, the new
leaders of Russia after the dissolution of the USSR had very high expectations about joining
Western international organizations and expected high Western investments to help restructure
the debt and stabilize the currency.
Although neorealism and neoliberalism differ in their emphasis on the importance of
state’s relative gains vs. absolute gains, they are similar in taking a state’s identity and interests,
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as well as the structure of the system in which states operate, as exogenously given. Also, both
neorealists and neoliberalists focus on how the behavior of agents generate an outcome.
However, another theory that tries to explain international relations, constructivism, claims that
the system of international relations and state’s interests are not static nor exogenously given, but
instead depends on the intersubjective understanding and expectations of actors, as well as the
“distribution” of knowledge, that forms meanings of the “self” and “others” (Wendt, 1992). It is
collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize states’ actions. States obtain
identities – relatively stable and role-specific understanding of themselves – by taking part in
such collective meanings. Identities are therefore relational, and a state may have multiple
identities. These identities are the basis of interests, which are defined in the process of defining
situations. On the other hand, an institution is a relatively stable structure of identities and
interests (Wendt, 1992). Institutions do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world
works, and they make sense only in the context of actors’ socialization and being part of
collective knowledge. Constructivists argue that institutions are essentially cognitive concepts
that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world operates. Moreover, they state that
self-help and power politics are not basic features of anarchy, but institutions instead, and, thus,
“anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, constructivism – a theory that
emphasizes the role of ideas and culture in explaining international relations – aims to explain
fundamental blocks of both neorealism and neoliberalism, such as states’ interest, institutions,
and the structure of relations. One can not disagree that such theory is very important and useful
in answering baffling questions of the nature and character of international politics.
Although it might be difficult to separate actors’ material interests from ideas and culture,
constructivists like Hall (1997) argue that the separation is not necessary. Hall quotes
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Kratochwill: “it is the analogy to money that gives “power” purported explanatory force. But as
we all know, money is not a thing but a shared convention”, and explains that the capacity of
money to act as a mechanism for exchange is due to the agreement between parties using this
mechanism. The social context of this agreement accounts for using money as a mechanism for
economic exchange. Economic power resources might be applied to understand policy goals in
the economic sphere, but the success of this move depends on a social convention. Also, Hall
argues that “the utility of material power resources is indicated by the care with which actors
labor to equip themselves with these resources” (1997). Material and Ideational factors do not
need to be separated from each other, but may rather enrich each other in our understanding of
the nature and complexity of the international system.
The scope of social constructivists is the full array of roles that ideational factors play in
international politics; it is not limited to specified roles that based and tested on theoretical
assumptions like in neorealist or neoliberalist research (Ruggie, 1998). Constructivist empirical
research studying the relationship between principled beliefs and patterns on international
outcome includes studies of cooperation on combating the climate change, cooperation on
termination of apartheid, decolonization, the role of human rights in international politics, etc. In
these cases, the empirical research aims to establish the impact of shared beliefs by epistemic
communities on resolving particular policy problem, such as ozone depletion; explaining
redefining states’ interests as in the case of antiballistic missile treaty; and describing operational
content to general state interests, as at Bretton Woods. Ruggie argues that separating ideational
impacts from institutional is a difficult task, but “that problem is not unique to the epistemic
community literature” (1998).
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Another important factor that needs to be taken into account, while thinking about testing
constructivist ideas in social scientific terms, is that “causation” itself might be understood
differently than in neorealist or neoliberalist settings. As Ruggie states, some ideational factors
do not function causally in the same manner as state interests in neo-utilitarianist theories of
international relations do: for example, the role of aspirations, the impact of legitimacy, and the
power of rights - these factors are reasons for actions but not causes of actions (1998).
“Reasons” and “causes” do not have the same causal capacity and should not be exchanged one
for another, or measured in the same way. Therefore, constructivist theories of the role of ideas
and culture in the international relations require a different approach than neoliberalist or
neorealist theories, but it does not mean that constructivist research is impossible.
Neither realism, not institutional liberalism could explain the growing strength of the
opposition to the new liberal government and the influence of the domestic opposition to the
foreign policy approach. In addition, liberal storylines that tout universal principles of
international law and territorial integrity tend to ignore predisposition of one to regard one’s own
intentions and behavior as a positive force in the world (the US double-standards on
characterizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea as outdated state aggression while ignoring the US
violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq just a few years earlier; the US support
of Israel’s occupation of Gaza, but condemning Russia’s support in Eastern Ukraine). Liberal
institutionalism also systematically downplay, marginalize and ignore the situational, contextual,
and spatial factors that may account for state behavior (Toal, 2017). For realists, on the other
hand, the world consists of superpowers with real agency and smaller states as subordinate
clients. An analysis of the deeper context reveals statements that contradict later policies adopted
by Russia. Why Putin stated on May 17, 2002, that Ukraine joining NATO was “a matter for
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those two partners,” and on August 29, 2008, that “Crimea is not a disputed territory,” needs to
be addressed.
Geopolitical culture, as described by Toal (2017), helps to address the weaknesses of
realism and institutional liberalism. Toal defines geopolitical culture as state’s prevailing sense
of identity, place, and mission in the world (2017). Thus, geopolitical culture is about the identity
of the territorial entity, and the locational narrative it presents to itself and the world; it answers
questions such as who are we, how do we survive, and how do we prosper. In other words, the
geopolitical culture is made up of a series of understandings and perceptions about self and the
other in the world and is part of the constructivist approach. The constructivist theory focuses on
the identity as a dependent variable determinant by the historical, cultural, social and political
context, towards the significant Other. The changing identity of the state together with dynamic
national interests can explain phenomena that both realism and liberalism lack explanation of,
such as the influence of domestic opposition on foreign policy course. Also, Tsygankov argues
that both realists and liberalists tend to emphasize one aspect of international system at the
expense of others and that these two theories view Russian foreign policy through the lenses of
Western culture and ignore Russia’s authentic history and system (2010). Neither realism nor
liberalism is fully satisfactory in explaining the variation in Russia’s international strategy.
Therefore, I choose constructivism as theoretical lenses through which I analyze the research
question and based on which I construct my argument.
1.1. Overview of the foreign policy discourse during Yeltsin presidency vs. Putin presidency
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the Russian foreign policy since the
collapse of the USSR through the lenses of theoretical approaches discussed above – realism,
institutional liberalism, and constructivism. The aim of this section is to demonstrate that each

9

The variation in Russia’s foreign policy in Near Abroad
approach has its strength and weaknesses, and explains best the Russian foreign policy
discourse in particular set of circumstances.
The turmoil of the USSR’s dissolution and subsequent years of Yeltsin’s presidency
provided a fertile ground for two contrasting tendencies within the Russian political elite.
First, the desire for change, was reflected in a reform agenda that aimed not only to
revolutionize thinking and practice in all spheres of Russian life but also to destroy the old
Communist administrative structures - in only a few years, Russia’s firms were no longer stateowned, its people could own property and firms, its government relied on taxes for collecting
revenue, and its currency was traded on foreign exchange markets (Desai, 2005). However,
political, economic and societal reforms were more than just “basic goods,” necessary to
provide Russia with fresh values and identity. Political elites were also motivated by the quest
for political supremacy of the new over the old. Also, the matter was also personal for Boris
Yeltsin. Throughout his presidency, Yeltsin retained a strong personal attitude towards the
past and its representatives, one that influenced his whole approach to rule. It was not just
Communism, its system and ideology, that was being targeted, but Communists as people.
This combination of the ideological and the personal created an unusually fractious political
environment, in which implementation of a demanding and controversial domestic reforms
was undermined by conflicts between the executive and legislature, in addition to more
“usual” problems for Russia like political corruption and lack of will.
In addition, the instability of the recent past stimulated a natural desire for order and
predictability. The situation that Boris Yeltsin was left with after the Union’s dissolution in June
1991 was disastrous. Ever since the 1970s, the USSR had been losing its economic power at the
world stage. GDP per capita was steadily declining, and living standards were falling (Aven,
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2013). According to the CIA World Factbook, by 1990, USSR’s GDP was less than half of the
United States’. These negative tendencies got worse in the USSR’s final years, 1989 and 1990,
during which the country witnessed declines in output, huge shortages and fears of a complete
economic and political collapse. In 1989, the average citizen spent 40 – 68 hours a month standing
in line, reflecting the difficulty to acquire even the most basic consumer goods in Russian markets.
In April 1991, less than one in 8 respondents to an opinion poll said that they had recently seen
meat in state stores, and less than one in 12 had seen butter. In fall 1991, CNN predicted
widespread starvation for the coming winter, making the need for a drastic change in the economy
all the more urgent (Aron, 2002). The rapid speed of events and uncertainty of the future
fostered a yearning for a pause, in which to evaluate the developments and consolidate the
changes that had happened, before moving on to the next set of challenges.
Yeltsin administration wanted to capitalise on the liberal momentum of Russian relations
with the West, and advocated their idea of mutual interests with Western countries: Russia and the
West are not two cccompletely different or opposite identities, but rather, Russia is primarily a
Eurocentric, if not completely European, power, and the similarities between the two should be in
plurality, democratic rule, free market economy, and individualism. “Russia has from time
immemorial been with Europe, and we must enter the European institutions, the Council of Europe
and the common market, and we must also enter the political and economic unions…” Yeltsin
declared in 1992 (Maitra, 2014). Realists argue that after a brief momentum of the liberal peace in
the post-Cold War environment, Russian foreign policy slowly started to move back to its realist
roots when Yevgeni Primakov replaced Kozyrev. Russia renewed its focus on relations with the
formerly Soviet republics in Central Asia, emphasizing economic and security projects, and started
developing strategic ties with China and India (Maitra, 2014). In January 1996, Yevgeni Primakov
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started pursuing the “pragmatic nationalist” and “Eurasianist” viewpoints, declaring that “Russia
has been, and remains, a great power, and its policy toward the outside world should correspond
to that status” and “Russia doesn’t have permanent enemies, but it does have permanent interests”.
On the other hand, the NATO expansion into the former East European Communist exWarsaw Pact countries, starting with Poland, led to a considerable unease among the Russian
leadership. Maitra argues that the Russian leadership under Primakov charted the realist balancing
route, and accepted the impossibility to avoid of the move, but not before guaranteeing a NATORussia joint council, that formally for the first time allowed Russia to have a voice in NATO
deliberations (2014). Patterns of realism were noticeable in Russian foreign policy even during the
Kozyrev era, though it became more significant during Primakov’s term as Foreign Minister. The
Russian meddling during the Georgia-Abkhaz crisis of 1992- 93, involvement in Tajikistan’s
internal affairs, growing patrolling the Afghan border, and nuclear trade with Iran are best
explained by the realist framework.
Vladimir Putin’s arrival as Prime Minister in 1999 restarted the economic reforms that
began under Yeltsin and strengthened the controlled over oligarchs using the military and security
elites. In the foreign policy realm, Putin supported the United States and made a massive proWestern shift after 2001 (Maitra, 2014). Russia’s bandwagoning in the “War on Terror” got a great
positive response from the West immediately. Following the Moscow theater hostage crisis and
the Beslan school siege, that involved actions by Chechen terrorists, the disproportionate response
from Russia drew criticized by the international community but got support from the US and
Britain. Thus, the bandwagoning with the US and West helped Russia to use the narrative and
agenda of the global war on terror to strengthen the domestic security apparatus, to put pressure
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on internal dissent, and create a new budget to an ambitious rearmament plan. Putin’s response to
the Chechen terrorists also bolstered his image at home as a strong leader (Maitra, 2014).
The next phase in the Russia’s foreign policy discourse, which characterized by its renewed
intention to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO), is best explained by the liberal
institutionalist framework. Oil and gas exports and general trade increased because of the proper
regulations, institutional changes, structural reforms, and policies, resulting in an unprecedented
economic boom. As a result of a strong economy, the social welfare programs improved, as well
as the general living conditions and wages of average Russians, following a period of chaotic postSoviet experiments. In 2004 the economy recorded its sixth consecutive year of growth since the
prolonged output collapse of 1989–98. For 2004 as a whole, GDP grew at a rate of 6.6%, compared
with the 7.3% achieved in 2003. As a result, Russia maintained a high trade surplus and was able
to meet its external debt repayments ahead of schedule. Inflation continued to decline and was
projected at somewhat over 11% over the year. The state budget recorded its fifth successive
surplus. Russia continued to accumulate foreign-currency reserves, which exceeded a year’s
supply of merchandise imports. Simultaneously, sovereign foreign debt fell about GDP and was
below a quarter of the national income. Therefore, the economy not only was growing robustly but
also had high international liquidity, which made it more stable than at any other time since 1991
(Teague, 2004). The pride and prestige of being recognized as a great power were coming back.
Realists argue that Russia was back on the world stage as a partner in the global “War Against
Terror,” looking to legitimize the new role of a revived and revanchist great power and projecting
power through economic and political–military means. As the relations with the US started to
deteriorate after the US unilateral invasion of Iraq, Russia was seeking to ally itself with other
western countries to balance the United States. However, that also changed after the advent of
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“color” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. The West started supporting the democratic change
and transition in Russia’s neighboring countries, which were always a part of Russia’s perceived
sphere of influence (Maitra, 2014). Also, the NATO enlargement processes largely estranged
Russia and established a new dividing line which excluded Russia.
However, the Russian foreign policy could not be fully explained by realism only. Liberal
institutionalism explains how post-Soviet authorities were challenged by a combination of civil
society, local political forces, common people and international actors, human rights groups and
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The former Soviet republics with a relatively liberal
political environment, such as Georgia and Ukraine, had a developing civil society to use foreign
assistance and an emerging independent media which, in turn, gave means to the opposition to
organize and mobilize. As the relations with the West deteriorated, Russia started challenging
agreements that were concluded in the 1990s when it was perceived as weak. In addition, the “rose
revolution” in Georgia (November 2003-January 2004), the “orange revolution” in Ukraine
(January 2005) and the “tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan (April 2005)— demonstrated the loss of
Russia’s influence in these countries and changed the Russian foreign policy discourse in the
region and in Russia-West relations. Institutional liberalists argue that substantial Western support
for the civil society and the Western-backed NGOs were instrumental in all the cases (Maitra,
2014). Also, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye said in the 1970s that “transnational relations may
redistribute control from one state to another and benefit those governments at the center of
transnational networks to the disadvantage of those in the periphery.” (Maitra, 2014).
At the Munich Conference of 2007, Putin demonstrated the new strategic and tactical
foreign policy framework, which was far more cynical, threatening and offensive. Putin critiqued
the United States on the issue of Iraq and missile defense, stating that Russia would plan to deal
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with these “threats” asymmetrically and effectively (Maitra, 2014). Within months from the
Munich Conference, the long distance bomber patrols across the Atlantic were resumed. Putin
announced on August 17, 2007, just after the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO’s) Peace
Mission 2007, the restart on a permanent basis of long-distance patrol flights of the Russian Air
Force Tu-95 and Tu- 160 strategic bombers that had been suspended since 1992. Russia started to
be increasingly assertive in dealing with its neighbors and intruding into their personal affairs,
especially Ukraine and Georgia. Relations with Georgia especially worsened over the territories
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which resulted in a Russo-Georgian war in 2008, when the Russian
Army defeated the Georgians in five days and declared the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Crimea was annexed shortly after the pro-Western government in Ukraine came to power
in February 2014.
Strong economic growth in recent gave Russia to increase its prestige on the international
stage. Both Russia’s status as the primary provider of Europe’s gas and its growing economy
helped make it an important global actor. Russia today has real resources. In August 2006, Russia
paid off its Paris Club debt early, despite the penalties—a move that was perceived within the
country as a reduction of Russia’s obligations to the West. Russia’s Stabilization Fund was
restructured in 2008 into two parts: a Reserve Fund designed to bolster the federal budget as oil
prices drop and a National Prosperity Fund for investments in public works, education, health care,
and agriculture (“Russia’s Stabilization Fund Hits $121.7 Bln as of Jul. 1,” RIA Novosti, July 2,
2007). Not surprisingly, Russia’s most important foreign relationships reflect Russia’s patterns of
trade. Liberal institutionalism argues that economic interdependence and global trade bolster state
cooperation, but it fails to explain why Russian energy foreign policies were more often
unsuccessful in countries of Near Abroad. Although the European countries are Russia’s most
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important regional trading partner (see Figure 1), states of the former Soviet Union do play an
important strategic role for Russia

Figure 1. Russian Exports and Imports by Region, 2006 (Source: Oliker et al., 2009).
The countries on Russia’s borders are unquestionably important to Russia, but Russian
policy in the region has not been universally effective. Belarus, Tajikistan, and Armenia have very
close ties to Russia and support Moscow on many issues, but other neighbors have taken their own
path since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The tensions that have resulted were manifested
prominently in the Russo-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008 and Crimean annexation in
2014. The three Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) have joined the EU and NATO. The
reasons why it is so important for Russia to maintain influence in the region comes from Russia’s
historical quest for prestige, its fundamental security concerns, and economic priorities. Long
before the Soviet Union, these countries were part of Russia’s empire. Many Russians, therefore,
see these countries as natural partners and allies that are crucial to Russia’s national interests. A
Russia without significant influence in these countries is less of a descendant of Imperial and
Soviet Russia and is thus less well aligned with Russians’ view of their nation and its global role
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(Oliker et al., 2009). The Near Abroad countries are also important to Kremlin as trade partners.
In order to sustain growth, Moscow has a clear interest in continuing normal trade relationships
with its neighbors, including terminating subsidies for energy exports. Thus, Russia has
dramatically increased in recent years the prices Gazprom charges Ukraine and Belarus for natural
gas. This is also the region where Moscow has perhaps the strongest interest in controlling
pipelines and energy flows to enhance its pricing power with its European customers and to ensure
that supplies meet its domestic energy needs (Oliker et al., 2009).
There are two main concerns for Russia regarding security issues in the region. The first
fear concerns “conflict spillover”: Russia’s long, porous southern borders increase the risk that
any nearby violence would spread into Russia or demand Moscow’s involvement (Ivanov, 2004;
Demurin, 2007; Delyagin, 2007). The second fear is about instability and subversion of armed
violence, such as radicalism, a succession crisis, the failure of governments to maintain power—
are viewed in Russia as dangerous in multiple ways. They are dangerous because they create
uncertainties on territories that are a key interest to Moscow and because they could cause
neighboring states to become hostile, and the mechanisms of instability could spread to Russia as
well. While security issues fall into the category of realist theoretical framework, constructivism
also finds it to be relevant. A geopolitical culture, as discussed earlier, is also about security and
defense, about whom the state holds to be its enemies and the strategies it finds to be necessary to
preserve its existence, identity and capacity to act (Toal, 2017).
Russia’s attempts to use energy as leverage to increase its influence more often than not
failed in Near Abroad. For example, throughout the 1990s, Russia repeatedly threatened to cut off
supplies of natural gas and oil to Ukraine as a punishment for Ukraine’s failure to pay for that gas.
The threats were also a response to Ukrainian policy moves that Russia saw as hostile, especially
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those efforts undertaken after independence by each successive Ukrainian government to build ties
with the United States, the EU, and NATO. As a result of Crimean annexation and separatist
conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine stopped buying gas from Russia, and pays a higher price for
the same Russian gas but buys it from the West.
Georgia is not a crucial transit country for Russian gas or oil. However, as with Ukraine,
Russia has failed to translate Georgia’s dependence on Russian energy into strategic gains.
Although Kremlin’s relations with Georgia were not perfect when Eduard Shevardnadze was
president, they have deteriorated further since Mikheil Saakashvili had come to power in the Rose
Revolution. Saakashvili’s government had consistently pursued membership in NATO. Russia, in
turn, aggravated the Georgian government by supporting Abkhazia and South Ossetia, breakaway
regions within Georgia. Georgia accused of years the Russian military “peacekeeping” presence
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and intimidating Georgia through violations of Georgian airspace
and other actions. Tensions increased in 2006 when Russia banned imports of Georgian wine and
mineral water. Georgia then took into custody and expelled four Russian military officers, accusing
them of spying. Russia retaliated by withdrawing its ambassador, imposing more economic
sanctions, cutting transport links, and expelling Georgian nationals. Russians and South Ossetes
exchanged escalatory behavior with the Georgians for three years leading up to the August 2008
war.
The Georgian effort to retake South Ossetia by force in August 2008 prompted a Russian
invasion of the smaller country. In the energy sphere, Georgians have argued that frequent breaks
in the pipeline that transports gas to Georgia have been intentional acts of sabotage on the part of
Gazprom. The Georgian foreign minister described Gazprom price increases as a form of political
pressure (Osborn, 2006.). During the 2008 conflict, Georgians accused Russia of targeting energy
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pipelines - Russian jets targeted a key oil pipeline with over 50 missiles in one weekend in August
2008 (McElroy, 2008). Russian economic sanctions hurt Georgia. Russians had formerly been big
customers of Georgian wine and mineral water - Georgian wine has been a popular item in Russia,
accounting for about 90 percent of exports before the ban. The ban led to the closure of many
vineyards. Since then, they have recovered as Georgia expanded sales to other markets, but at 23
million bottles in 2012 the vineyards were still far behind 57 million bottles exported in 2005
(Dzhindzhikhashvili & Heintz, 2013). Although many sanctions were eventually lifted, bilateral
relations remained poor, and efforts to normalize relations were short-lived, Russia’s use of energy
and other foreign policy instruments failed to force Saakashvili to back down in South Ossetia,
culminating in August 2008 in armed conflict.
Similar to Georgia, Russia temporarily banned imports of Moldovan wine to demonstrate
that Moscow was not happy with Moldova’s interest in improving its relations with the West
(imports have now resumed). Moldova did not back down in the face of Russian pressure.
Relations between Russia and Moldova have been tense because of Russia’s support for the
autonomy of Transnistria, a region that is located in the eastern part of Moldova. Separatists in
Transnistria have survived in part because of continued supplies of Russian natural gas and the
presence of Russian soldiers (peacekeepers). Moldova, too, depends on Russia to fulfill almost all
of its energy needs. Moreover, gas pipelines to Moldova go through Transnistria. When Russia
stopped gas supplies to Moldova during an argument over price in the winter of 2005–2006,
Moldova purchased gas from Ukraine and eventually negotiated a moderate price increase with
Moscow. In early 2008, Moldova asked Russia to recognize Moldovan territorial sovereignty over
Transnistria; in exchange, it promised to remain neutral and permanently forgo NATO
membership (Rusnac, 2008). In April 2008, Moscow directed talks between the Moldovan
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president and Transnistria’s leader. These talks were seen by the OSCE as a potential progress in
a formerly frozen process. Although these tendencies demonstrate that Moldova may have been
more receptive to Kremlin pressure than Ukraine or Georgia, it is not obvious that energy is the
reason. Rather, both countries seem to be engaged in a protracted negotiation over strategic issues
(Peuch, 2008).
A review of the scholarly work since the collapse of the USSR in 1991 demonstrates an
almost universal support among scholars of IR, foreign policy analysists and area study specialists
that identity and ideational factors are key determinants for an understanding contemporary
Russian foreign policy. For example, Henry Kissinger focuses on Russia's historical legacy and
argues that Russian historical roots will “result in a missionary and imperial foreign policy
orientation” (1994). Fukuyama believes that interests are related to the sustained level of economic
growth, out of which a sense of nationalism emerges in Russia, which in turn guide Russian foreign
policy; Wolfowitz states that country’s historical legacy is not necessarily its destiny, and that the
discourse of Russia’s foreign policy depends on whom it is governed and how, the assumption that
foreign policy of a democratic Russia would be completely different from autocratic Russia –
therefore the West should have helped Russia to transition into democracy by fostering a strategic
partnership and including it in expanded democratic security community (Sestanovich, 1994).
However, at the time Putin took the office of the Prime Minister in 1999, there was still no
agreement on Russia’s national identity in Russia. During the Cold War, the identity of the state
was dictated by the Soviet empire and the ideology of the Communist Party. Identity and the state’s
destination were guided by the conflict between East and West. After the collapse of the USSR,
Russia was left in limbo with an uncertain sense of identity and the conflict among political elite
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over the future direction of Russia. Without a fixed identity since 1992, Russia became chaotic in
its internal and external affairs (Shearman, 2001).
This trend of an absentness of the national idea about Russia’s foreign policy and
Russian identity in the world and the conflict between institutions of power had been reflected
during the crisis in Transnistria (Pridnestrovie) in 1992. Due to tensions in emphasizing
priorities in Russia’s foreign policy, there was not a united strategy of Russian government
actions in Transnistria in 1992. By examining the events in Transnistria through the various
theoretical approaches in the following chapter, I find that Russian foreign policy in
Transnistria in 1992 reflected the search for “Russian identity” of the divided political
institutions that were formed in Russia after the dissolution of the USSR. The absence of the
consensus about Russia’s place in the world echoed in the indecisive and incoherent strategy
of the Russian government that created a “frozen” conflict in the area for two decades.
Liberal institutionalists argue that the period after the collapse of the USSR was
“transitional” for Russia, assuming that Russia was moving towards a liberal democracy and a
market economy. Therefore, Russia had had an emerging identity of a democratic state that was
linked to its new destination of a modern capitalist economy (Shearman, 2001). However, the
problem with liberal institutionalists is that they ignore the history and culture of the state, and in
their logic, all post-communist states would follow the same path of development, which is
obviously contested in contemporary international relations. IR scholars studied heavily the
influence of domestic factors on Russian foreign policy, and some studies highlight the political
level rather than those related to material capabilities. A lot of attention was put to the examining
of different institutional groups’ perceptions, from which competing foreign policy discourses
have been identified (Shearman, 2001). Eventually “liberal westernizers” under Andrei Kozyrev
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were replaced by the administration of Yevgenii Primakov, who took a more assertive stance
towards the West. The cultural-institutional context is important in the development of foreign
policy and the construction of concepts of national interests. Shearman argues that it is important
what type of institutions the state has and that depends on the politics of identity (2001). For
example, even in the absence of a real threat to Russia, Russia took a strong anti-Western position
after the Iraq invasion and NATO expansion. Studies have demonstrated after the examination of
elites discourse, policy statements, and opinion polls, that the expansion of NATO is not perceived
as a military threat in Russia (Shearman, 2001). Although the structure of the international system
is not seen by constructivists as a determining factor in Russian foreign policy, international factors
do help to shape state identities. Political leaders who create policies do respond to external
international events, but they do so on the basis of their own perception of the strategic
environment. Also, in comparison with the former USSR, now domestic politics play a much
important role in defining the foreign policy since the political elite is no longer isolated from
societal pressures. As in Robert Putnam’s concept of two-level games, Russia has to balance
between the representation of domestic interests and consequences of foreign developments. For
example, Yeltsin’s foreign policy approach towards the West had been complicated by the need to
balance between domestic interests and the US, NATO, IMF policies. Shearman argues that
interests are not simply a reflection of material capabilities, but are defined through complex
processes of societal and political developments (2001).
My argument is that as an understanding of Russian national identity and national
interests has been developed and strengthened together with the stable growth of national
economy and reinforcing the statehood, Russia’s foreign policy changed from being indecisive
and vague to assertive and insistent. Aggressive actions of Russian government in Georgia
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(2008) and Ukraine (2014) and clear violations of an international law, compared to an
indecisive strategy in Transnistria in 1992, demonstrate how change in understanding a national
identity and one’s place in the world lead to a variation in solving different conflicts in the same
region of near abroad countries. The aim of this master thesis is to compare and contrast how
different conditions in cultural, external, domestic and institutional spheres during Yeltsin and
Putin administrations led to formation of Russia’s national identity (or the absence of thereof)
and how that, in turn, influenced the change in Russia’s foreign policy in near abroad states.
1.2.Case studies of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine
An overview of the foreign policy course during Yeltsin and Putin's presidencies provided
above, allows one to trace a change in Russia’s attitude towards conducting foreign affairs. In
order to answer the research question which looks for an explanation of the variation in Russian
foreign policy over the last twenty-five years, I focus on Russian foreign policy towards Near
Abroad States – the region of the former Soviet Union – an understanding of thereof will
provide a lens to understand changes in Russian foreign policy over time. I specifically look at
Russia’s foreign policy behavior during “frozen conflicts” in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.
There is also a “frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. However, the involvement
of Russian military is indirect there, compared to direct involvement in Moldova, Georgia, and
Ukraine (Jackson, 2003). Therefore, due to the limit of the master thesis paper, I have to narrow
down my research to the Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine cases and look at the direct
involvement of Russian military into “frozen” conflicts in Near Abroad region. In all of these
three cases, ethnic conflicts began after the dissolution of the USSR, during the Yeltsin
administration, and continued well into Putin’s presidency. However, the foreign policy course
towards these countries and an attitude towards the involvement of Russian military into these
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regional conflicts were handled differently. In my master thesis, I analyze through the lenses of
realism, institutional liberalism and constructivism the conditions in which Russian foreign
policy in Near Abroad states evolved and changed over time. I argue that as an understanding
and perception of the Russia’s national identity, national interests and Russia’s place in the world
of international affairs became more coherent among the Russian political elite, so did change
the foreign policy discourse towards the states Near Abroad and the strategy to solve conflicts in
the region. This tendency is best explained by the constructivist approach. The case studies of
Transnistria in 1992 vs. 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1994 vs. 2008 and Crimea in 1992
vs. 2014 provide evidence that proves my argument.
Chapter 2. Russian Foreign Policy under Boris Yeltsin.
2.1. Yeltsin’s foreign policy in the Near Abroad: cases of Moldova and Georgia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin´s foreign policy got a lot of attention in the
international arena and its domestic field due to its differentiation with the foreign policy of the
USSR. In Russia, some people considered Yeltsin as a visionary; others saw him as a traitor
because of his warmer relation with the West (Keller, 2000). The main goal of Yeltsin’s foreign
policy was to create a non-threatening external environment in the relation with the Western
countries in a situation of declining relative power for Russia1. The Yeltsin administration foreign
policy course can be described as “Westernization,” which was based on the idea that Russia and
the West shared a common set of values and principles (UNSC; 1991; p.45). On his report to the
UN Security Council in 1991, Yeltsin stated: “Russia regards the United States and the West not
as mere partners but rather as allies” (UNSC; 1991; p.44). This new approach has reflected the

As Selezneva (FAWN; 2003; p.10) states: “The new Russia ha[d] no imperial status. Its population ha[d] decreased
by 110 million people. Fifteen independent states ha[d] replaced the former Soviet republics[...] . The Baltic countries
did not join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at all and look[ed] very firmly towards Western Europe”,
among other situations which evidenced Russian decline.
1
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desire of a new Russsian government to improve the relation with the West, especially the USA,
beyond the past of confrontation. Within its regional context, the Yeltsin’s main goal was to keep
its dominance in its “Near Abroad.” The term "Near Abroad" describes the fourteen other former
Soviet republics that declared their independence by the time of the Soviet Union dissolution at
the end of 1991, and where Russia have had a dominant position and promoted cooperation through
the creation of the CIS-Commonwealth of Independent States seeking to re-establish or preserve
Russian dominant position, in what was now called the old ‘Soviet geopolitical space’ (Lynch;
2010; p.165).
During Yeltsin’s first term as a president, a military conflict in Transnistria (Moldova)
began in 1992. Although, it is important to mention that the roots of conflict in Transnistria go
back to the end of 19th century when Russian Empire annexed Bessarabia that was previously a
part of Ottoman Empire and was populated by Romanian-speaking people mainly at that time. The
unification of Romania and Moldova occurred in 1918, and a special treaty in regards Bessarabia
was signed by Romania, France, Italy, and Japan in October 1920. However, the Soviet Union
expressed special interest in Bessarabia in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and in June 1940 invaded
and occupied Bessarabia. At the same time, The Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
was created. During Soviet times more than 500,000 Moldovans were deported to Siberia. The
Soviet post-war economic policy was to develop western part of Moldova as an agricultural area,
with military-related industry located in Transnistria.
The ethnic conflict and language question in Moldova reappeared again when the Soviet
Union collapsed. On 31 August 1989, the Supreme Soviet of Moldova adopted three new language
laws, making Moldovan the official language using Latin script, and acknowledging the unity of
the Moldovan and Romanian language. Russian would be used as the language for inter-ethnic

25

The variation in Russia’s foreign policy in Near Abroad
relations, and the Gagauz language was to be protected and developed and was to be the “official
language” alongside Moldovan/Romanian and Russian in areas of Gagauz population. The use of
other minority languages such as Ukrainian and Bulgarian was to be protected. The nonMoldovan/Romanian-speaking minorities of Moldova were against these changes to the language
laws. Russian and Ukrainian groups staged mass meetings, strikes, and violent protests, as
organizations to defend the use of the Russian language were established on the right bank
(Edinstvo) and in Transnistria (the Union of Work Collectives). The Turkish-speaking Gagauzia
in Southern Moldova also demanded national and cultural rights (Kramer, 2008). There were also
talks in Chisinau about reunification with Romania, but the mostly Russian-speaking population
of Transnistria resisted it. The clashes between Moldovans and Transnistrians took place in March
1992, followed by a declaration of a state of emergency on March 28. Around the same time, a
force of 600 was created by the Gagauz, which conducted occasional raids on the government in
Southern Moldova. Fighting between Moldovan and Transnistrian forces intensified again in May
and June. The Transnistrian secessionist movement, headed by Igor Smirnov since 1991, has been
dependent on the support of Moscow, including the continued deployment of the Russian Army’s
operational group of 1,500 soldiers. These troops are the remainder of the Soviet 14th Guards
Army (and later Russian 14th Army), which intervened on behalf of Smirnov against the Moldovan
government in the war over Transnistria in 1991–92 (Kramer, 2008). After a peace agreement had
been signed in July 1992, the Moldovan authorities began seeking the removal of Russia’s
occupation forces from Transnistria.
Regarding foreign policy, from August 1991 to March 1992, Russia’s government
comments on the topic were limited. The Russian political elite was in general sympathetic to the
Transdnistrians because of their long-standing economic, political and ethnic connections with the
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regions. Jackson argues that because of these connections and because the Soviet Union just
collapsed, early foreign policy debate was dominated by the nationalist idea of reuniting Russia
with Transdnistria (Jackson, 2003). However, these debates seem to have had little impact on
Russia’s official foreign policy. Rather, official policies were based on liberal westerner's ideas of
supporting Moldova’s new “democratic” government and territorial integrity. Supporting
separatists was not an option for Yeltsin’s administration because it could jeopardize the
relationship with the West, and perhaps even lead to separatists sparks inside Russia. However, in
Moldova, the 14th Russian Army acted independently on a relatively small scale and armed and
trained Transdniestrian troops.
From March 1992 to October 1992 Russia became military involved in the conflict for the
first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly opposed the
involvement in the conflict, but the Parliament supported this strategy; as a result, no official policy
was drawn, and the 14th Army continued to support Transnistria. After another outbreak of fighting
in July 1992, the cease-fire agreement was reached: a tripartite peacekeeping force, a territorial
integrity of Moldova and gradual withdrawal of the 14th Army (Jackson, 2003).
From October 1992 to June 1996, parliament and media supported Transnistria vocally,
and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs changed its position and now argued for military
involvement of Russia in the conflict. However, by 1996 the support of Russia’s military
involvement in Moldova was tempered by its financial, humanitarian and legal costs.
In November 1999, shortly before Yeltsin resigned, the Russian government (with Putin as
prime minister) formally agreed to remove all Russian troops from Transnistria, but Putin as
president reneged on the commitment. Over the past few years, officials in Moscow have
repeatedly indicated that Russian forces will stay for the indefinite future in Moldova as
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“peacekeepers,” thus designating the wishes not only of the Moldovan government but also of the
European community. Transnistria’s Russian-speaking population believes that its identity would
be overtaken by the ethnic Moldovan majority and thus perceives the Russian military presence as
protection. Moldova, in turn, states that Russian troops violate its territorial integrity and that
Moscow has repeatedly refused any attempts to reach a compromise. For these reasons, many draw
a parallel between this long-simmering “frozen conflict” in Transnistria and the ongoing situation
in Crimea and Ukraine (ADST, 2016).
Georgia, another country that constitutes Near Abroad, similarly has faced secessionist
movements from two regions throughout its twenty-five years post-Soviet history, the regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The regions are situated in northern Georgia along the Russian
border. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several ethnic groups called for self-determination,
threatening both the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia. Secessionist campaigns in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia began at the end of the 1980s when the renewed rise of Georgian
nationalism during Mikhail Gorbachev’s era of perestroika increased inter-ethnic tensions within
the Soviet Republic. Both regions have been long suspicious of the Georgian state, fearing the loss
of ethnic identity. These suspicions were intensified when Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the leader
of the Georgian Supreme Soviet in 1990, predominantly on the basis of his support for the rights
of Georgians, promoting under the slogan “Georgia for Georgians” (German, 2006). Georgian
nationalism after the collapse of the USSR represented a second genocidal campaign against
Ossetians in the Ossetian nationalist narrative, while the first genocide took place between 1918 –
1920: during this period Georgian government destroyed almost 40 Ossetian villages; almost 5,000
people perished, mostly displaced persons who died from starvation and illness. Around 20,000 to
35,000 Ossetians were forced to flee across mountains to get to North Ossetia (Toal, 2017). The
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compromise was a creation of a South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast on April 20, 1922 (although
recognized as a separate ethnoterritorial region, this was a lesser status than Abkhazia and Adjara,
both of which became Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics within Georgia). However, this was
viewed as Soviet “occupation” by Georgian nationalists during the entire Soviet period, and once
the USSR collapsed, South Ossetians were again viewed as “ungrateful guests” on historical
Georgian soil (Toal, 2017). The violent conflict struck again on January 6-7, 1991, citizens were
killed, property looted, and this pushed into another spiral of ethnic polarization and violence. The
peace was reestablished on June 24, 1992, through the mechanism of a Joint Control Commission
(consisting of OSCE, Georgian, Russian, North and South Ossetia representatives), and a peace
agreement signed in Sochi between Shevardnadze (who had replaced Gamsakhurdia after a violent
coup in January 1992) and Yeltsin. The Sochi agreement was limited and imperfect instrument for
handling the conflict, but it created forum for a dialogue, and in the following decade a progress
on certain issues was made: reliable electricity and water flow was restored, the trade between
different parts of South Ossetia was restored, which provided livelihood for many South Ossetians.
In the period from 1996 to 2001 ethnic tensions subsided. The Russian Federation provided salaries
and pensions to South Ossetians under the control of local government, and a sizable number of
South Ossetians acquired Russian passports under the terms of prevailing Russian citizenship law
(Toal, 2017).
The situation in Abkhazia was different. The Republic was de facto independent in the
1920s before Stalin incorporated it into Georgia and supported ethnic Georgian migration into the
region. As a result, by 1989 Abkhazians accounted only for 18% of the population, while ethnic
Georgians constituted 46% in contrast to other regions where the Abkhazians were a majority.
Gamsakhurdia pursued a more appeasing approach in relations with Abkhazia than with South
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Ossetia and avoided all-out war. Gamsakhurdia’s successor, Shevardnadze, was however far more
confrontational and, with both sides refusing to find a compromise, the war began in 1992. The
Georgian forces faced the defeat by the end of 1993 and the 1994 Moscow agreement formalized
a ceasefire, that provided a legal basis for the introduction of a CIS peacekeeping force that
included around 1,700 Russian peacekeepers, together with the establishment of a UN observer
mission (UNOMIG) to monitor the agreement (German, 2006).
Regarding Russia’s foreign policy towards Georgia – Abkhaz conflict, there was not an
official position on this issue acquired by the Russian government at the beginning of the conflict.
While some members of Russian political elite favored the Abkhaz, the ties were not as strong as
those with the Transdniestrians, who were mostly ethnic Russians (Jackson, 2003). However, the
Abkhazians opposed the division of the USSR, and thus, received the vocal support of individuals
in Russia who had the same goal. In contrast, the government of Georgia (similarly to the
government of Moldova) was asserting its independence and trying to distance itself from its
former ties, which was supported by many Russian politicians who shared the thinking of liberal
westernism. On 28 August 1992, Boris Yeltsin issued “An Appeal from the Russian President to
the Leadership of Georgia and Abkhazia” in which he proclaimed Russian support for the
Georgian territorial integrity and promised to prevent Georgian army entering Abkhazia. As it was
stated at that time in the Russian liberal newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta: “If we ourselves set
such as example, we will have a moral right to exert pressure (but not through violence or the
threat of violence) on behalf of Russian minorities and peoples like Gagauz, the Ossetians, and the
Abkhaz.” However, Shevardnadze repudiated the negotiations, and a full-scale war has followed.
A Russian-brokered agreement in May 1994 provided for the deployment of a peacekeeping
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mission of CIS (in practice, wholly Russian) to monitor the security zone (King, 2015).
Negotiations on Abkhazia’s final status, brokered by the UN, have continued since then.
Summarizing this section, we can argue that Russian official foreign policy was in line
with the constructed by Yeltsin administration state liberal democratic “identity,” supporting the
territorial integrity of Moldova and Georgia, and keeping a neutral position as a peacekeeper in
Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. I am going to take a closer look how a search for a
national “identity,” domestic factors, institutions and external events affected Russia’s foreign
policy discourse in Moldova and Georgia in the first decade after the dissolution of the USSR.
2.2. How the search for a new national identity affected the course of foreign policy
The new leaders of Russia supported the intellectual tradition of Westernism, which
states that Russia is the part of the West and should integrate with Western economic and
political institutions and that the main threats come from non-democratic states (Tsygankov,
2010). Therefore, the new government saw their country naturally as a part of Western
civilization. They believed that the “authentic” identity of Russia had been hijacked by the
Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the Soviet system. Followers of Westernism intellectual
tradition argued that during the time of Cold War Russia had acted against its “true” national
identity and interests, and after the dissolution of the USSR, Russia finally had a chance to
become a “normal” Western country. Andrei Kozyrev, who was the first foreign minister in
Yeltsin administration from 1991-1996, was part of Westernism tradition, which also included
Yegor Gaidar and Gennadi Burbulis, argued that the Soviet Union was a “wrongfully developed”
country, not just “underdeveloped” one. This position has roots in the intellectual debates of the
nineteenth century, when Westernist scholars argued that although Russia had its distinct
national characteristics, nevertheless it would develop and go through the same stages of
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development as the West. The reason for such a linear worldview was that the West had been
perceived as the only progressive civilization by the Westernism school of thought, and the only
way for the world society to progress was to share democratic values and implementation of
human rights as promoted by the Western civilization. Thus, the new leaders of Russia at the
beginning of the 90s believed that main threats to Russia were coming not from the West but its
economic backwardness and partnership with nondemocratic countries, especially with some of
the former Soviet allies. The new foreign minister Kozyrev shared these ideas, and as other
idealistic reformers promoted radical policies that would lift Russia up to the standards of
Western countries within a short period (they were arguing it would take two-three years
maximum), after which Russians would significantly improve their standards of life. Also, some
members of the former party entered a private business after the fall of the USSR and wanted to
obtain a private control over the former state property. Thus, the goals of idealistic reformers and
former party members were in line: reformers advocated pro-Western capitalist reforms, while
the former party members were trying to become a class of new capitalists. Therefore, the
Westernist coalition under Yeltsin appeared to be in a position to act on its foreign policy beliefs.
The foreign minister Kozyrev advocated for a philosophy of integration with the West
and its political, economic, and security institutions. Kozyrev believed that the very system of
values in the country had to be changed – the priority of the individual and the free market over
society and the state had to be accepted. Only by following that path Russia could achieve a
natural integration with the West and the level of development the same as this of France,
Germany or the United States within time frame of ten to twelve years (Tsygankov, 2010). The
members of Westernism coalition argued that the new national interest of Russia was “in
transforming Russia into a free, independent state, formalizing democratic institutions, setting up

32

The variation in Russia’s foreign policy in Near Abroad
an effective economy, guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of all Russians, making our people’s
life rich both materially and spiritually.” The three key components of this new vision of national
interest were an isolationist position the former Soviet states, a radical domestic economic
reform, and membership in the Western international institutions (Tsygankov, 2010).
First, the new concept of national identity assumed that Russia’s relations with Western
countries would take priority over the relationships with countries of the former Soviet Union.
The new leaders of Russia argued that Russia suffered from unfair Soviet imperial burden –
Russia had constantly to subsidize other republics using its resources. Therefore, the new
government was looking in the direction of separation from the former republics culturally,
politically and economically: the plan was to stop subsidizing ex-republics, as well as to
withdraw Russian military and to rely more on help from international organizations, such as the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in solving possible conflicts in
the region. This liberal Westernist concept of national identity and national interests significantly
influenced the new foreign policy created in late 1992 and signed into law in April 1993. Thus,
the foreign policy and strategy of the Russian government in solving the conflict Transnistria
(Moldova) that started in 1992 was heavily affected by the new concept of national identity. I
develop this argument furthermore in the last section of the first chapter where I analyze the
conflict in Transnistria in details.
The Yeltsin administration promoted a path of radical economic reform – “shock
therapy.” The plan was for Russia to transition into the capitalist economy fast and permanently.
The idea was that in the post-Cold War world Russia should no longer worry about external
threat and geopolitics, and instead focus on creation a modern political and economic system.
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Yeltsin believed that the West would finally recognize Russia as “their own” and would be
interested in investing resources in Russia’s transformation.
Integration with the West through joining international organizations was the second
critical component of the foreign policy of the new Russian government. The plan was to obtain
a full membership in such transatlantic economic and security institutions as the European
Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), G-7,
and so on. Yeltsin believed that Russia should no longer pursue its “greatness” but instead
cooperate with the West on the variety of international issues by joining “the community of
civilized nations.” Tsygankov argues that contrary to the realist assumption, the Yeltsin
administration did not pursue this strategy out of the weakness of the country material
capabilities because reformers’ idealistic worldview could be hardly linked to pragmatic
calculations of a weakened superpower (2010). Instead, idealistic reformers used a collapse of
the USSR as an opportunity to establish a new identity for Russia. However, not realists, not
liberalists who acknowledged the impact of western ideas of modernization on Russian liberals,
could have predicted or explained the strength of growing opposition in Russia to the Westernist
course.
2.3. The impact of domestic factors on foreign policy-making
In spite of the democratic changes that occurred after the disintegration of the USSR, the
President remained to play a key role in the process of foreign policy decision making through
what was called the “parlor politics.” This centralization of the decision-making process was an
inheritance from the Soviet era. Also, the president’s involvement in the design of the Russian
foreign policy increased as warm relation with the West started to deteriorate. As Simmons
described: “Moscow has not concealed its preoccupations about NATO’s enlargement toward
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areas that are of particular strategic importance to Russia, namely the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea,
Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus. Implicit in this understanding is American political pressure to
maintain the cleavage between NATO decision-making and the political initiatives of the
European Union” (p.218). The increasing centralization of power in the President resulted in a
weak institutionalization that can be seen even in the current times in Russian government
(Simmons, 2008). Yeltsin’s foreign policy position could be considered pragmatic in the sense that
it consisted mainly in “short-term decisions, grasping opportunities to achieve practical results,
without considering the long-term consequences” (Fawn, 2003). One can differentiate between
Yeltsin’s first and second terms about the government’s position on foreign policy. Between 1990
and 1996, Andrei Kozyrev was appointed as Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. Kozyrev
was one of the main executors of the Westernization process. On the contrary, the second period
between 1996-1999, was defined by the resignation of Kozyrev and the designation of Evgeniy
Primakov, who has been considered a part of anti-Western echelons of Russian establishment.
Primakov’s foreign policy has been called the “policy of alternatives” (Fawn; 2003) and its main
goal was to contain the advance of NATO in the Russia`s “Near Abroad.” This change in the
foreign policy approach was determined by the pressure that Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic
Party together with the communist leaders put on Yeltsin, calling for an isolationist policy. Those
actors interpreted the Yeltsin’s “Westernization” as Russian subservience to the USA, and
expressed their concern on actions taken by NATO in Russia´s “traditional backyard.” The fact
that “the new political elite of Russia consisted mostly of former communists who could not
change their political philosophy and did not want to—the philosophy of confrontation with
Western countries” raised a lot of critics especially during the first presidency of Yeltsin (19911996) (Fawn, 2003). Yeltsin also faced opposition to his foreign policy discourse on social grounds
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– as Fawn states: “the Soviet population was used to the idea of the Soviet Union being the
strongest country, a social paradise whose historical mission it was to bring happiness to humanity”
(Fawn, 2003). The public discontent with Yeltsin’s foreign policy was deepened by the role of
media and increased even more due to the internal economic situation. The economic crisis
included hyperinflation, the fall of GDP by 50%, a high unemployment rate and the deterioration
of incomes and people´s living conditions. Also, “some aspects of the policies of the Western
countries, such as the extension of NATO, the discriminatory policies of the IMF and the bombing
of Belgrade in 1999, stimulated suspicious feelings towards Western countries among the
population, and among the political and military elite” (Fawn, 2003).
2.4. Institutional constraints of Russian Federation and their impact on development of foreign
policy in neighboring countries
In addition to Russia’s domestic problems and the West’s disengagement in helping
Russia to transition to a democratic state and a modern capitalist economy, the rise of opposition
towards the course of Westernism became possible because of the availability of various
institutional channels. A historically dominant nationalist political culture and low centralized
democratic system provided the opposition with some institutional advantages. An efficient use
of institutions, such as parliament, media, and influential nongovernmental organizations, helped
the opposition to the pro-Western government to advocate their position and sabotage Kozyrev’s
foreign policy course. Parliament (the Supreme Soviet) played an especially significant role in
confronting the Westernist course by formulating the concept of “enlightened imperialism” in the
former Soviet region. This concept described the entire territory of the former USSR as the
sphere of Russia’s vital interests. The members of parliament also criticized Kozyrev
administration for one-sided pro-Western orientation and supported expressed a more diversified
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foreign policy. An important agency with direct access to Yeltsin was Foreign Intelligence
Service (FIS), managed by Primakov. Throughout 1992–1994, the FIS was supporting a more
diverse foreign policy with an emphasis on the former Soviet area. Primakov was focusing on the
economic and security issues within the area of former republics, and after the NATO’s
expansion initiative argued for the Russia’s need to readjust its western course and eventually
influenced Yeltsin. Primakov replaced Kozyrev as foreign minister in 1995 and announced that
the relationship with former Soviet republics would be his priority (Tsygankov, 2010).
Other important government channels included the Presidential Administration and
Security Council. The Presidential Administration argued that Russia should be a cultural bridge
between Europe and Asia, and emphasized the need to defend the rights of ethnic Russians in the
former Soviet republics. The Russian Security Council supported this view, and challenged
Kozyrev’s position by drawing “Guidelines for the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.”
This document described Russia as a future world power, as a bridge between East and West,
with specific interests in the “Near Abroad.”
Outside the state, the non-governmental organizations such as The Council for Foreign
and Defense Policy and The Civic Union played a significant role in undermining the Kozyrev’s
foreign policy course. The Council for Foreign and Defense Policy expressed some views of
industrialists, businessmen, intellectuals, and mass opinion leaders. The council has emphasized
the need for Russia’s more “Near Abroad”–oriented policies and pragmatism in relationships
with the western countries. The Civic Union movement united voices critical of the Westernist
discourse and advocated for Russia’s national interests defined regarding achieving a great
power status in Eurasia. Interestingly, the Civic Union was working from inside the mainstream,
slowly shifting the balance of power within the political elite. Both organizations aimed to re-
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establish economic ties with former Soviet republics and worked closely with each other
(Tsygankov, 2010).
2.5. How external conditions affected the course of foreign policy making towards Near
Abroad states
The course of isolationism in Yeltsin’ official rhetoric in the first half of his term toward
the former Soviet republics was a continuation of their Westernist beliefs. With a great desire to
integrate with the West as fast as possible, the new administration did not want to carry a burden
of former Soviet republics in assisting their transformation in case they wanted to pursue a
similar goal. The new government argued that Russia suffered an enormous burden by
subsidizing other republics instead of selling raw materials and natural resources to them by the
market price. The government’s position was if Russia were to continue this path, it would have
become a victim of its generosity. Also, the Yeltsin administration believed Russia also suffered
politically and culturally during the time of the USSR, and that Russia should focus on
rebuilding its identity in “civic and nonimperial” ways. This meant a formation of a civic
Russian (rossiyskaya) nation, which would include all citizens of the Russian Federation
regardless of their cultural and religious differences, rather than ethnic Russian (russkaya) nation
(Tsygankov, 2010). This would mean that Russia would not to be responsible for the well-being
of twenty-five to thirty million ethnic Russians—about 30 percent of the homeland Russians—
who lived in the former Soviet republics outside Russia.
The Westernist foreign policy community in Russia supported the isolationist component
towards Near Abroad in the country’s national interest and argued against Russia becoming a
core in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The reasoning behind it is that a goal of
entering the G-7 and moving from the periphery of the world economy to its core would be
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undermined by participating in CIS affairs as the main actor since these interests would
contradict each other. Thus, liberals argued that Russia should “give up the CIS in favor of
orientation toward Europe.” That view began to change in 1993 when Russia initiated the CIS
Economic Union agreement, which aimed to develop a multilateral economic cooperation
(Tsygankov, 2010).
In the security sphere, Russia’s isolationist course attempted to reduce to a minimum
responsibility for maintaining order in the former Soviet region. Tsygankov argued that there
were four specific goals that the new Russian government tried to accomplish after the
dissolution of the USSR: the fastest possible withdrawal of Russian troops from outside Russia;
the support of the control on the former Soviet troops by new governments in ex-republics;
ignoring separatist movements on the territory of the former Soviet Union and keeping relations
with the central governments; inviting international organizations to participate in settling
conflicts in the post-Soviet region (2010). The Yeltsin’s administration tried to accomplish those
goals until approximately mid1992. Yeltsin ordered the withdrawal of the military from
Nagorno-Karabakh while asking for the deployment of NATO troops as a peacekeeping force
there at the same time. When Chechnya proclaimed independence in November 1991, the
military intervention was ruled out as a policy option. Yeltsin also did not initially oppose
Ukraine’s taking control over the former Soviet military located on its territory. Neither did
Russia show any concern over the status of ethnic Russians in former Soviet republics. The
strategy only changed when military conflicts had a potential of spilling over to Russia. Thus,
when the Moldova’s leadership had an intention to reunite with Romania in 1992, it triggered
violent conflict in Transnistria, which gravitated to Russia economically and culturally.
Moldova’s first effort to stop fighting was to involve the OSCE. However, it did not produce any
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result promptly. To prevent the spread of violence and civil war, Russia intervened to stop the
fighting and to negotiate a cease-fire and took a task of a peacekeeper in the region. The foreign
minister Kozyrev at first condemned the army involvement, but he changed his mind and favored
the intervention later in June, and that established the precedent for further interventions in
Tajikistan, Georgia, and elsewhere. I analyze the conflict in Transnistria in details in the last
section to provide evidence for my argument, which states that Russian foreign policy and
strategy in solving the conflict in Transnistria has changed over the last twenty years as the
Russian national interests changed, and the new concept of national identity has evolved.
Chapter 3
3.1. Putin’s foreign policy in the Near Abroad region: cases of Georgia and Ukraine
The end of the Yeltsin’s administration is characterized by a great economic depression,
high level of street crime and violent fight among former party members – new oligarchs – for
winning control over privatization of former state assets. With the assumption of Vladimir Putin
as President in 2000, the portrayal of Russian greatness as a natural state of affairs became
increasingly prominent within the official discourse. During Putin’s first term in office, Moscow
sought to construct Russia as a great power that was a reliable, yet powerful, state that had
embarked on an appropriate path of development after the chaotic 1990s. In the aftermath of the
9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, the Kremlin sought discursively to construct
Russia as a natural partner of Washington in the fight against terrorism. Putin’s first term has
been widely seen as the ‘liberal’ era in Russian post-Communist politics, and the second term,
with the 2004 Beslan massacre as a significant discursive turning point, as sharpening the
rhetoric of the president (Angermuller, 2012).
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However, this love affair with the West did not last long. Putin publicly opposed the Iraq
invasion mission and the US unipolar strategy as a whole and claimed that Russia would veto
any US-sponsored Security Council resolution that would authorize the use of force against
Saddam Hussein. It was only one year since the beginning of the second phase, and yet, a
renewed period of Russian bitterness towards the West began again, which is described by
Spechler as the third phase in Putin’s foreign policy 2002-2003 (2010). The bitterness was soon
transformed into outright hostility. The fourth phase (although Spechler’s analysis only covers
Putin’s foreign policy acts till 2008, I argue that the phase of hostility has continued till now,
2017), was characterized by the growing Russian hostility beyond the US to include NATO and
the European Union. By the year 2016, the relations between Russia and the West became as
damaged as they had been during the last decade of the Cold War. Indeed, during this period
Russia suspended its commitment to and considered withdrawing from post-Cold War East-West
security institutions such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which could have happened in response to the
US’s intention of deploying missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia
also started testing and displaying offensive weapons that could potentially penetrate the US
national missile defense system. Putin kept criticizing the US and publicly accused the US of
having intentions to create a division inside Europe, undermining international institutions, and
instigating a nuclear arms race (Spechler, 2010). The Baltic countries went back to being a
contentious issue as Russia claimed that if NATO were to extend to those countries, Russia
would act accordingly. Spechler also argues that when the pro-democracy color revolutions
began in countries like Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Putin started to describe the Western plan as the
one that seeks to install West-friendly regimes in the CIS to surround Russia and eventually
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bring about regime change in the country itself. Therefore, he labeled human rights and prodemocracy Russian NGOs as instruments used by Western governments to channel funds to
change the regime in Russia. Putin also took other actions to remove Western influence on the
CIS: countries in the region that had any relations with the West were somehow punished by
Russia.
The relationship between Russia and Georgia gradually escalated after the Rose
revolution in 2003 and 2004 presidential election of Saakashvili, who focused on furthering
democratic reforms and Georgia’s accession to NATO. Despite the efforts by the OSCE, UN,
and EU to negotiate a peace settlement in Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, the conflict remained stalled. On July 3, 2008, an Ossetian village police chief was
killed by a bomb, and Dmitriy Sanakoyev – the head of the pro-Georgian ‘government’ in South
Ossetia - escaped injury by a roadside mine. During that night both the Georgians and South
Ossetians launched artillery attacks on each other’s villages and checkpoints killing and injuring
dozens. The European Union, the OSCE and the Council of Europe (COE) urged both parties to
resume peace talks. On July 21, 2008, the UN Security Council discussed the violation of
Georgian airspace by the Russian military planes that occurred on the 8th of July. During the last
week of July 2008, paramilitary forces from both sides escalated what had been an on-going and
consistent level of moderate violence. On the morning of August 8th, the Georgian military
decided to officially respond with military force, arguing that South Ossetian forces did not end
their shelling of Georgian villages. Georgian troops soon controlled much of South Ossetia,
including Tskhinvali (Henrikson, 2016). The Russian military, which had been steadily
advancing into the breakaway regions, quickly responded to South Ossetia’s defense with a
massive counter-attack, leading to five days of intense fighting throughout the region. Russian
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warplanes destroyed Georgian airfields near the capital Tbilisi, recaptured Tskhinvali, occupied
the bulk of South Ossetia, and reached its border with the rest of Georgia (Henrikson, 2016). On
August 12, the Russian government announced that the aim of their military operation - coercing
the Georgian side to peace - had been achieved and that the operation had been concluded. On
August 26th, Russia formally issued a press release recognizing both Abkhazia and South
Ossetia as independent states. In doing so, Russia justified its actions under the principle of the
responsibility to protect Russian citizens, regardless of where they live. The Russian leadership,
amongst other arguments, cited the ‘Kosovo precedent’ in response to the massive international
critique of the decision to grant these break-away republics the status of independent states
(Toal, 2008).
Much of Russia’s official discourse took the form of a response to the critique deriving
from large segments of the international community and was thus dedicated to explaining
Russia’s choices in the war context and thereby seeking to justify the military intervention and
the post-war developments. It was even more important for the Russian leadership to promote
Russian actions to the domestic audiences, to garner the necessary support for the war, the
independence recognition and the permanence of the Russian military troops. The message
presented to the Russian public was well perceived and the approval rates for both President
Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, lay at 83% and 88%, respectively, in
September 2008, according to a survey by Russia’s main independent and most trustworthy
polling agency, the Levada-Center.
The majority of the scholarly accounts of the 2008 war explain the outbreak of war as
based on an inherently assertive Russian foreign policy that is a natural result of Russia’s
aggressive and even expansionist tendencies. According to realist worldview, the survival of
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states must be guaranteed by promoting national interests and strengthening military capabilities
(Dunne & Schimdt, 2008). War, from this viewpoint, is a legitimate instrument of statecraft.
Moreover, states cannot rely on other states or international institutions to ensure their security.
Russia’s self-help approach in this war and its sheer negligence of the international community
clearly indicates the realist worldview of Kremlin. Second, the power struggle within Georgian
politics and the nationalistic rhetoric of Saakashvili seem to have made things worse just before
the war broke out. On the other hand, Putin’s frequent rhetoric regarding Russian identity had a
manipulative impact on the escalation of the crisis.
In the constructivist framework, the Russo-Georgian war can be explained regarding
Russia’s evolving image of great power, which involves concepts of compatriots and Russian
World. This discourse was used by the Russian government to justify its military intervention in
Georgia as merely protecting the Russian-speaking population and granting them “their inherent
right to life and dignity.” The protection narrative thus drew on a language of legal concern and
human rights, repeatedly mentioning Article 51 of the UN Charter to claim Russia’s
responsibility to further people’s right to individual and collective self-defence, and the UN’s
‘responsibility to protect’ principle (R2P). References to international law were mainly aimed at
international audiences due to the primary role of international law within international relations
as well as to the general Russian population who would support the protection of its citizens and
compatriots wherever they might be located. Claiming that Russia would be prepared to protect
these people wherever they might be located, however, adds to the sense of insecurity in the
countries along Russia’s borders that host a large number of ethnic Russians and Russian
speakers. The usage of the compatriot concept arguably increased the sense of insecurity due to
its vague definitional borders that allow for the protection of people in the neighboring countries
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who have some looser affinity to Russia. As demonstrated later in this section, this concept can
include all peoples who were once part of the former Soviet Union and used to justify military
intervention in other countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Ukraine and annexation of
Crimea.
Putin launched periodic “gas wars” (in 2006, 2008, and 2009) meant to strengthen
Russia’s hold on Ukraine using energy-related blackmail. During the 2004 Orange Revolution,
Moscow intervened in Ukrainian affairs by openly backing Viktor Yanukovych’s bid for the
presidency. That is when it became evident that Ukraine had become Vladimir Putin’s personal
project. He began treating Ukraine as a Russian domestic issue that he could exploit to
strengthen his regime (Shevtsova, 2014). The right to control Crimea has been one of the factors
adding to the ongoing tension between Russia and Ukraine. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
the tension grew into a full-scale conflict between the two States, leading to Russia’s support of
separatists in Eastern Ukraine
Located south of the Kherson region in Ukraine and west of the Russian region of Kuban,
Crimea is a peninsula on the northern coast of the Black Sea. A history of the area shows that
Crimea has had relations with Russia for centuries. After the Russian Revolution in 1917,
Crimea became a republic within the USSR. In 1954, it was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic and became an autonomous republic within the newly independent Ukraine in
1991. In late 2013, Ukrainian President Yanukovich declined to sign a trade and cooperation
agreement with the European Union. This decision resulted in massive and violent
demonstrations in Kiev and other parts of Ukraine (Roslycky, 2015). As a result, in February of
2014, President Viktor Yanukovich was removed from office, and an interim government was
put in place, which was not recognized by Russia. Shortly after, troops started appearing in
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Crimea and seized control over the key military and governmental buildings as well as other
strategic facilities. In March 2014, the Crimean status referendum asked the people of Crimea
whether they wanted to join Russia or if they wanted to keep their status as part of Ukraine. The
Supreme Council of Crimea stated that the referendum was in response to their stance that the
new government in Kiev was illegitimate (Laurelle, 2015). Russia supported this referendum and
the opinion of the Ukrainians who wanted to join Russia (in March 2014, 79 percent of Russian
respondents said that they supported the integration into Russia of Ukrainian regions that
requested this. Just a month later, in April, that figure had dropped to 58 percent. See
www.levada.ru/06-05-2014/rossiyaneob-ukrainskikh-sobytiyakh). After the referendum, the
Supreme Council of Crimea and Sevastopol City Council declared independence of Crimea from
Ukraine and requested to join Russia. On March 18, the Russian, Crimean, and Sevastopolian
leadership signed the Treaty on the Adoption of the Republic of Crimea to Russia, making
Crimea an official part of Russia. On March 24, Russian troops seized most of Ukraine’s bases in
Crimea, and Ukrainian troops were transported from their base in Perevalne, Crimea. Russian
President, Vladimir Putin, justified his events in Crimea as Russia’s moral duty to take care of
Russian communities outside of territorial Russia and to respect Crimea’s desire to rejoin the
motherland.
Norm-based constructivist and classical realist theory can be used to analyze the crisis
between Russia and Ukraine, each theory giving different reasoning behind why the conflict
started, and the implications that it has brought to the nations involved and the international
community. Russia’s annexation of Crimea would be seen by realists as an assertion of power by
Russia and an attempt to increase power in pursuit of self-interest. Classical realism affirms that
states have an innate desire to dominate others and Russia is following that school of thought
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because they are allowing themselves to get into a conflict with Ukraine for the purpose of
bringing Crimea under their wing and increasing their territorial power in the region. It could be
argued that Russia seeks to expand their military and economic capabilities when the overall
benefits outweigh the costs (Mearsheimer, 2013). The costs that Russia is facing are dampening
its international reputation because many states are against Russia’s actions, but Russia is
gaining more territorial power and expanding its power in the region nonetheless. Although
Russia may continue to suffer economically from the withdrawal of foreign investment and
reduced access to the European energy market, these costs must not outweigh the benefits that
Russia gets from having Crimea as a member of its nation. Also, Crimea is of considerable value
for the Russians because of its strategic location. Sevastopol, the peninsula’s main city, has a
port that gives the Russian fleet direct access to the Black Sea, allowing the Russian fleet to
maintain its presence in Eurasia (Cohen, 2014). A moral standard of realism is that a state’s
primary interest is survival of itself, which requires power over those other states that may pose a
threat. Therefore, the ultimate moral obligation of the state is to maintain power about those that
would threaten the state’s existence and its citizens (Williams, 2004). In realist framework,
Russia has seen the United States as a threat and is greatly against Ukraine having relations with
the West. Russia’s growing insecurity could play a role in why Russia is working to increasing
its power over surrounding nations. A realist would claim that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is
to further Russia’s interests as a strong power in the international community and to deter others,
such as the United States from thinking they can go against Russia. The realist theory would also
state that President Putin believes that Western interests are to contain Russia’s influence
internationally and use their power to increase their influence in the world. Putin did not want to
take the chance of losing Ukraine to the US and all the strategic benefits that come from having
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Crimea under its wing. Therefore, Russia chose to take charge in Crimea, preserving Russia’s
interests in Ukraine and attempting to keep power in the region. Therefore the realist notion that
states pursue security at all costs may be an explanation as to why Russia is pursuing power
outside of its country.
In contrast to the realist thought that power is the most important in relations among
nations, constructivist theory focuses more on the cultural and historical relations that Russia has
with Ukraine. Constructivism’s claim that a state’s identity and subsequent actions and interests
are shaped by social norms may be used to explain the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Putin has used
the sense of Russian identity in Crimea to justify Russia’s annexation of the peninsula. For
centuries, Crimea Province was part of the Russian Republic until it was transferred to the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 (Laurelle, 2015). From a
constructivist viewpoint, emotional associations to the territorial identity of a state influence how
people understand policy choices. Putin argues that Crimea’s cultural links to Russia are stronger
than they are to Ukraine and associated his actions in Crimea with emotional attachment and
ideas of identity. Therefore, the idea of a strong Russian identity in Crimea may be used to help
explain Russia’s interest in reclaiming it. Constructivists would look at Russia’s actions as
identifying with the people living in Crimea and acting according to the historical identities that
the people have with one another. President Putin has stated that the steps that were taken by the
leadership of Crimea were based on the norms of international law and aimed to ensure the
interests of the population of its people. Russia is stating that they have not committed
wrongdoing because their act to allow Crimea to be a part of Russia was a proposal from another
independent nation (Moiseev, 2015). Also, with more than a million Russian- speaking citizens
residing in Crimea, Putin focused on the nationalistic and social feelings within Crimea to
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legitimize his claim. Putin said his action were protecting the Russian population from the
insurgency that was arising in Ukraine (Tandilashvili, 2015). Constructivism affirms that a norm
is when a sufficient number of agents accept and adhere to that norm. Therefore, Russia’s
argument is that Russia is taking into account the expression of the will of the people in Crimea
in the referendum of March 2014, adhering to international norms and rules. Russia argues that it
conforms to international law, using its inalienable right to recognize a state and conclude an
international treaty with the agreement of the two parties involved. Furthermore, according to the
federal constitutional law of Russia, admission of a foreign state into the Russian Federation
shall be affected by agreement of Russia and the interested state, valid in this instance (Gillich,
2015). Russia has used the properties of norm-based constructivism to hold that their claim to
Crimea is within the boundaries of international rules, even though states such as Georgia, the
United States, and Ukraine appeal to the fact that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of
Ukraine are against international rules and norms.
Russia’s relationships with countries in the Near Abroad in the past decade have been
increasingly influenced by Kremlin’s interpretation of history and perception of Russia’s place in
the world. The concepts such compatriots, Russian World and Russian Civilization both have
stimulated and framed Russia’s approach toward its policy in neighboring countries. As this
perception of Russia’s mission in the world got strengthened among Russian political elite, the
foreign policy discourse has become more assertive. Therefore, it is important to take into
account constructivist analysis of Russian foreign policy for other actors to understand and
predict Russia’s future foreign policy discourse. However, the driving forces behind the foreign
policy changes that took place during the four phases were various, and it is relevant to analyze
each of them because they are still the driving forces behind the changes that are occurring in
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Putin’s third term. Even though, the particular weight that each force exerts might be different
today than it was during Putin’s first and second term.
3.2. Establishing a new identity
Tsygankov argues that during Putin’s presidency, questions of identity, perceptions of the
global environment, domestic political factors, and the interplay between institutional and
individual actors have lost little of their importance as determinants of Russian foreign policy
(2010). The debate about an identity had lost its intensity when compared to the Yeltsin period,
and instead, Putin adopted a flexible approach to the issues of the cultural and civilizational place
of Russia in the world. In particular, he has balanced a personal Eurocentrism by promoting
relations and contacts with non-Western countries and regions. Putin conducted two-way visits,
involving not only the major Western and non-Western powers but also several countries – North
Korea, Cuba – which Yeltsin conspicuously ignored. Putin has also carefully tailored his
messages to his audience. During his first term, when visiting Europe, Putin has spoken about the
European integration; in relations with the CIS member-states, Putin focused on post-Soviet
integration and common values and interests arising from a shared past and present; with China,
the focus has turned to “strategic partnership” in a multipolar world. This application of identity
has been accompanied by the political self-interest of the elite. Whereas under Yeltsin, rival
groups kept fighting about their ideologies, it is a very different story in the circumstances of
Putin’s near-complete dominance of domestic politics (Tsygankov, 2010). The conflict between
opposing groups has been practically eliminated. This resulted in that identity has become less an
active agent for influencing foreign policy discourse than a rationalizing device to be used to
achieve “national interests.” These multiple identities now serve justifications for Kremlin’s
increasing presence and participation in world affairs. Because one or the other identity can be
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“switched on” whenever it fits “national interests,” the Putin administration does not have to
make definitive choices as to overall foreign policy orientation. Instead, it has chosen a form of
civilizational universalism, of being all things to all people. This resulted in that Russia is at once
“regional” and “global,” “normal” and “great power,” “integrated” yet also “special” and
“different.”
3.3. How domestic factors influenced foreign policy discourse
Foreign and domestic policies are usually extremely interconnected. However, there has
been a tension between domestic factors and foreign policy discourse in Russia during Putin
administration (Sakwa, 2008). There was a growing concern about color revolutions in
neighboring countries of Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and fear that if those countries became
democracies than Russia could get “contaminated” with democratic values as well (Mendras,
2015). Even though it could be questionable whether these factors are not domestic or not, and at
the time of color revolutions Russia was at the peak of its economic growth and Putin had strong
domestic support, it can be argued that the fear that the revolution could spread to Russia could
have triggered a more aggressive foreign policy towards the West. Trenin (2009) argues that
despite that Putin has been a strong leader; he does have to think about how private citizens feel.
When the economic crisis hit hard, and ordinary Russians started feeling dissatisfied with the
Putin administration in his third term as president, protests started spreading through the main
Russian cities, which could not have been ignored by the government.
3.4. External conditions and its effects on Russia’s foreign policy

According to Spechler (2010), one of the most influential external conditions that forced
Putin to change the course of foreign policy were the terrorist attacks of 9/11. After 9/11 Putin
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changed his foreign policy orientation from a nationalist to a realist, because the attacks
highlighted the terrible power of a common enemy – Al-Qaeda. Russia took advantage of its
favorable geographical position and military strength to offer help to the US in its war on terror
with hopes that the US would in turn respect Russian interests and politics. However, the US’
decision to invade Iraq in 2003 in the absence of the approval from the UN Security Council,
was responsible for changing Russia’s foreign policy from a realist to a great power activist
status (Spechler, 2010). Iraq invasion openly disregarded the respect for international law - one
of Russia’s core foreign policy principles.

Also, the pro-democracy color revolutions that took place in the former Soviet republics
of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan from 2003 to 2005 also amounted to external conditions
that influenced Russian foreign policy discourse. For Kremlin to see anti-Russian, pro-Western
parties, to come to power in countries that Russia historically considered its “zone of influence,”
was a great matter of concern. Also, the fact that Western governments openly supported the
regime change in these countries led Putin to view the West attempting to cause an ultimate
regime change in Russia (Spechler, 2010). Moreover, Bush administration’s announcement in
January 2007 that it would deploy a missile defence system to Poland and the Czech Republic,
the US intentions to admit Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, and its support of Georgia before
and after the conflict with Russia, all added to the growing concerns that led Putin to adopt a
more assertive anti-Western position (Kuchins & Zevelev, 2012, p.156).

Therefore, Putin has chosen a foreign policy course that was different from the course he
pursued during his first two terms. However, Marcel De Haas (2010, p.21) argues that Putin had
already been following an increasingly assertive foreign policy on the West in his second term.
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De Haas states that the basis for that forceful foreign policy position was a mindset that saw
Russia as a renascent great power. Huge increase in oil prices provided revenue for Moscow to
reach this goal. As Russia became economically stronger, and the West experienced economic
crisis and military failures, Moscow started posing itself like a great power once again. Putin
strived to ensure that the West would never again neglect Russia as an internationally
meaningless player (De Haas, 2010). Also, the Russian elites and ordinary people never accepted
the idea of Russia as nothing more than a regional power. The reason why Russia accepted
NATO’s eastward expansion in the early 1990s, was only out of economic weakness, and a
position of a minor partner that should play by the Western rules, but is not able to shape them,
could have never been accepted. As the economy recovered, and Russia paid its financial debt to
the West, the Russian political elite strengthened the identity of Russia as a great power in their
perception. As the West’s supremacy got relatively weaker, Putin took advantage of it and used
it as a chance to reaffirm Russia’s status as a great power in the international arena.

3.5. Institutional factors and its impact on relations with countries of the former
Soviet Union

The traditional Russian state symbols and institutions of power are the Russian Army, the
Russian Orthodox Church, and the state security services the FSB and SVR. According to both
the Church’s and the Russian State’s logic, Russia is the center of Orthodox civilization, a sphere
of cultural, religious and historical influence that extends far beyond the borders of Russia. The
Church has aimed to regain the old canonical territory which coincides with the territory of the
former Soviet Union and has tried to be included in Russian foreign policy as much as possible,
looking to influence “brothers” Slavic states such as Ukraine, Belarus, and others. The Church
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has played a special role as the source of “spiritual fortification” for the Army and the state
security services during Putin’s presidency, as well supported Kremlin’s opposition towards
“foreign” human rights groups (Laurelle, 2008).
According to Laruelle, an important part of Putin’s foreign policy when he became
president, was understanding and acknowledging the limits of Russia’s traditional hard power
assets (the military, the geopolitical influence of the former Soviet Union) and to rebuild Russian
power in terms of both economic modernization and Russia’s vast gas and oil resources, taking
advantage of Near Abroad countries (2008). This direction led to the great transformations that
happened in the institutional context. Compared to bureaucratic instability, the overpersonalization of policy and politics, and Yeltsin’s divide-and-rule tactics created the
environment for a sectionalized approach to international relations during the 1990s, current
much calmer operating environment stimulated a foreign policy that is more centralized,
coordinated and disciplined than at any time since the dissolution of the USSR. One of the
reasons for this is an increased involvement of the security apparatus in the policy process. In
addition, the focus of Putin’s administration shifted to stabilization and restoration and built
around two slogans: the “vertical of power” and the “dictatorship of the law.” The Chechen
conflict, especially the tragic events of the Dubrovka Theater hostage crisis in October 2002 and
the Beslan school “massacre” in September 2004, caused the Putin administration to focus on the
need for returning to a constitutional of the Russia Federation. Putin’s first mandate as president,
therefore, focused on these issues. Putin’s second mandate (2004-2008) was more aggressive in
both domestic and foreign policy. Putin essentially minimized all forms of non-Kremlin
controlled NGO’s and consolidated his control over human rights groups and all forms of civil
society that could challenge his regime (Laruelle, 2008).
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During Putin’s presidency, due to his favorable relationship towards military, very strong
links between Kremlin neo-nationalist ideology and the perception of the Russian army as a
patriotic symbol have emerged. The Russian Army represents historical unity over and above
ethnic, religious and regional differences, and represents state power. Military history played an
important role, with the Soviet victories of WW2 as the natural focal point. There has been a vast
use of various media as tools of propaganda to reify the state security apparatus, in particular, the
FSB. Since 2000, the production of patriotic films has increased, especially movies and TV
series showing FSB agents as heroes fighting Chechen terrorists, since it used a special “Patriotic
Fund” set up by Moscow. Since 2009 the Education Ministry has been funding and promoting
films and TV shows like this in the interests of fostering “ideas of humanism, spirituality, and
other traditional values of the Russian peoples “(Laruelle, 2008). The Russian soldier, therefore,
is perceived as a symbol of integrity and honesty, and waging of has been justified in the name
of a “holy and eternal Russia.”
In conclusion about the period of Putin’s presidency, Russia has made efforts to restore
its prestige in the world and its identity as a Great Power. At the beginning of his presidency in
2000, Putin tried to start fresh with the West, Moscow reevaluated its national objectives to cope
with the constantly changing obstacles in international affairs, and aimed to adjust its foreign
policy course accordingly. The record so far has been mixed. On the one hand, Russia has
reasserted itself as an important global actor. On the other hand, Russian renaissance as a major
European and Asian power has brought back Cold War memories to some of its neighbors and
global competitors.
Putin has tried to take advantage of the opportunities offered by Russia’s strategic place
in geopolitics. An elaboration of a closer relationship with CIS countries has been high on the
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agenda since it is not only a matter of prestige for Moscow to keep a leading role among the
post-Soviet countries but also a way to secure stability in it's near abroad, where it has enormous
national interests. The Caspian region plays an important role as a source of Russian wealth and
serves one of the greater goals of Russian security policy - its economic development. The use of
Caspian oil and gas and the control over the pipelines has justifiably been prioritized by the
government, and any kind of penetration by other states and foreign industries in this important
area has been violently rejected. The strict policy concerning energy prices was reflected in the
energy-related disputes between Russia-Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, and with Belarus in 2004.
This demonstrated that Russia is not willing to allow any neighboring state to take advantage of
its geographic location and natural resources.
Relations with NATO remained difficult during the Putin presidency. Although Putin
wanted to avoid isolation and sought a special relationship with NATO after the 9/11 attacks, the
results were discouraging. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) failed to hold a strong partnership
and the expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe and its potential enlargement reaching the
Russia’s Near Abroad provoked the negative reaction of Moscow in the form of war with
Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, since the potential of participation of
Ukraine and Georgia in the western security organization constitutes a red line for Putin. As
Russia reestablished its identity as a Great Power, backed by the strengthened economy, its
foreign policy actions became more aggressive. Kremlin has recovered its pride and is exercising
once again classic Realpolitik to diminish Western influence in the former Soviet Union.
The West did not expect Russia to transform into such an assertive and forceful state that
it was now when it declared their victory in the Cold War in 1991. In the last nine years,
international community saw the Russian state invading Georgia and Ukraine, and annexing
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Crimea which was deemed as highly aggressive actions by the US and Western governments.
Trying to come up with a response to Russia’s actions in its Near Abroad, has been so far
unsuccessful due to a clear misunderstanding of Russian national and foreign policy identity by
the West. It’s important to analyze and comprehend the historical development of one state’s
policy patterns and the identities and meanings that it constructs through engagement with other
actors, to understand why a state acts in a certain way.
Chapter 4: Conclusion
In this master thesis, I analyzed the variation in Russian foreign policy in the Near Abroad
since the collapse of the USSR, focusing on “frozen” conflicts that had a direct involvement of
Russian military in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. The Russian foreign policy discourse has
been analyzed through the lenses of three main theoretical approaches in international relations:
realism, institutional liberalism, and constructivism. While institutional liberalism fits best at
explaining Russia’s foreign policy orientation during Boris Yeltsin’s first term as a president,
showing new independent Russia’s intentions to integrate with the West through cooperation in
the security and economic realms by joining international organizations, the realism is an adequate
approach to understanding Russian foreign policy behavior when Vladimir Putin took the president
office, and Russia acquired a more assertive position towards the conduct of US and European
affairs. However, both institutional liberalism and realism fail to account for historical, cultural
and domestic context, which provide a deeper understanding of variation in Russian foreign policy
over the last twenty-five years in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. I argued that as an understanding
and perception of the Russia’s national identity, national interests and Russia’s place in the world
of international affairs became more coherent among the Russian political elite, so did the Russian
foreign policy vary in solving different conflicts in the same region of near abroad countries from
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being passive and indecisive in 1992-1994 in Moldova and Georgia, when an understanding of
Russia’s national identity was conflicted during Yeltsin’s presidency, to being an assertive and
insistent as the idea of Russia’s role in the world has strengthened among Russian political elite
during the Putin administration. By examining the events through the various theoretical
approaches in this paper, I found that Russian foreign policy in Transnistria, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia in 1992-1994 reflected the search for “Russian identity” of the divided political
institutions that were formed in Russia after the dissolution of the USSR. The absence of the
consensus about Russia’s place in the world echoed in the indecisive and incoherent strategy
of the Russian government that created a “frozen” conflicts in the region. Also, Russian official
foreign policy in the 1992-1994 was in line with the constructed by Yeltsin administration state
liberal democratic “identity,” supporting the territorial integrity of Moldova and Georgia.
However, the discourse of Russian foreign policy in the Near Abroad has changed as the evolution
of Russian state “identity” took a nationalistic turn during Putin’s presidency, and the concepts of
compatriots, Russian World, and Russian Civilization were re-introduced among the political elite,
and often used to justify military intervention in countries of the former Soviet Union in order to
“protect” Russian-speaking population there, such as in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014.
Although, the correlation is not causation, and it is not just the change in understanding among
Russian political elite and ordinary citizens of Russia’s “national identity” and Russia’s place in
the world that change the course of the foreign policy. There are also domestic factors, institutional
constraints and external events that affect how the foreign policy is constructed. I analyzed these
factors during both Yeltsin’s and Putin’s presidency to provide a deeper understanding of the
context in which the sense of Russia’s identity has evolved, and the foreign policy has changed.
The dynamics of the “frozen” conflicts discussed in this paper are far from being static, and there
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are still many open questions regarding the status of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, and
Transnistria in international relations, but an understanding of the concept of national identity in
Russia’s politics provides an additional insight to the situation in the region, and, perhaps, helps
to predict Russia’s foreign policy behavior towards other countries in the Near Abroad.
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